examine the issue framed by the SFRC in its Condition Seven of the START I Resolution of Ratification. Condition Seven required the President to carry out a net assessment analysis on the good and bad impacts of arms control treaties. Losses from arms control treaties come from noncompliance to the arms control treaties. The benefits of arms control treaties come from the re duction of nuclear weapons, the removal of destabilizing weapons or tactics, and the establishment of cooperative measures to increase stability between the superpowers. Condition Seven requires the assessment be carried out in terms of military significance, namely the threat to U.S. nuclear forces.
The efficacy of arms control treaties was hotly debated before the SFRC. One side believed that arms control gave a predictable future that would avoid irra tional actions. The other side, championed by the Ranking Minority Member, Senator Jesse Helms, believed that Soviets would massively cheat to threaten U.S. national security. The SFRC national security staff was convinced that the importance of this issue warranted a serious analysis by the executive branch at the end of the Cold War. With this in mind, it was decided that a condition requiring a presidential report was needed to shed light on the issue.
MODUS OPPORENDI
Section I below displays Condition Seven and the SFRC report language that supported it. This is followed in Section II with a description of the Report to the Congress on Treaty Compliance. Because of space limitations we examine only the analysis of the INF treaty, and not the SALT agreements because they are too old, and not the START treaty because it had not entered into force at the time of the March 1993 presidential report. Section III is our conclusion on the adequacy of the presidential response.
I.A. SENATE CONDITION SEVEN ON TREATY COMPLIANCE 5
Within 180 days of the Senate's giving its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, the President shall submit to the Senate an updated and expanded compliance report in classified and unclassified form, setting forth- 
I.B. SENATE REPORT ON CONDITION SEVEN 6
The degree of Soviet noncompliance has been widely debated over the years. Condition Seven of the Resolution of Ratification requires a compliance report on all the major acts of compliance and noncompliance by the former Soviet Union and its successor states. Our future relations with the successor states on arms control treaties will, of course, continue to be addressed in the report called for in Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Condition Seven calls for expanded and updated compliance report that could well be the last such noncompliance report on the disbanded Soviet Union. This report calls for listing of all significant Soviet and successor states viola tions and probable violations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START treaties. This listing shall be accompanied with a discussion of the ultimate resolution of these issues. Second, Condition Seven requires a listing of the significant acts of compliance to these arms control treaties by the former Soviet Union, and the successor states. This list shall contain the num bers and types of systems eliminated, such as silos, missiles, and launchers. In addition, this report shall list the aggregate numbers of inspections and noti fications that were carried out without any problems, as well as any for which there were difficulties. Lastly the report calls for a comparison of the military significance of the acts in noncompliance as compared to the acts of compliance.
In the committee's view, the arms control process with the Soviets and their successors, on balance, has paved the way towards the reductions in the START Treaty and the deeper reductions in the prospective de-MIRVing Treaty. The report required in Condition Seven serves as a useful adjunct when considering the net benefit of arms control agreements with the former Soviets.
The committee therefore recommends a condition requiring the submission of a Presidential Report on Treaty Compliance and the Military Significance of Treaty Violations within 180 days of the Senate's giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the START Treaty. This updated and expanded compliance report will differ from annual Pell report (Section 52 of the ACDA Act) by listing all the actions of compliance and all the actions of past violation, or probable past violation, and then comparing the military significance of these two kinds of actions.
II. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT OF MARCH 1993
The Presidential Report consisted of one page of introduction, 11 pages on vi olations, 2.3 pages on acts of compliance, and 1.3 pages on a net assessment. The most clear-cut violations listed were as follows: The Krasnoyarsk radar (which was to be converted into a furniture factory) was a clear-cut violation to the ABM Treaty, but it was not militarily significant in a capacity to help shoot down U.S. ICBMs. The second "new type missile" (the SS-25) was a violation to the START II Agreement. Condition Seven did not address nuclear testing, but if it had, it should have discussed the history of the "likely violation" of the Threshold Test Ban Treat (TTBT). This charge was removed in 1990 after the 1988 CORRTEX measurements at Semipalatinsk Test Site and after prop erly taking into account the geological differences between test sites. 7 The U.S. record on TTBT noncompliance charges was not entirely honorable. 2. Non-declared Treaty-Limited Items. In the summer of 1988 the Soviets had some errors in their data in the Memorandum of Understanding, which they corrected.
II.A. VIOLATIONS TO THE INF TREATY (EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL REPORT)
3. Un-notified Movements of Training Launchers. There was a disagreement on whether notification was necessary for moving training launchers. The Soviets later agreed to do this.
4. Missiles at an Elimination Facility. Two SS-12 missiles that should have been removed were discovered at the Saryozek Main Operating Base.
5. Missiles at Non-declared Locations. For brief times, some SS-20 missiles and launchers were parked outside of two launch-to-destruction elimination sites. The boundaries of the two sites were redrawn since these were parked at these locations as a temporary convenience.
6. Cargoscan. For 10 days in March 1990 the Soviets refused to allow Cargoscan to x-ray image missiles the Votkinsk missile factory exit portal. The Soviets had objections to U.S. procedures, which were then modified for Soviet acceptance. had understandings that constituted what amounted to an undisclosed pro gram of cooperation. Thus, the United States has reaffirmed its previous finding that the Soviet Union negotiated in bad faith. The United States further found that the Soviet Union has probably violated the Elimination Protocol of the Treaty by failing to eliminate in accordance with Treaty procedures, re-entry vehicles as sociated with and released from programs of cooperation.
II.B. PROBABLE VIOLATION TO THE INF TREATY

II.C. ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY TO THE INF TREATY
The Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and facilities under strict verification by the United States. Since the last re port, the Soviet Union and new states of the former Soviet Union continued to allow the United States to exercise its inspection rights contained in the INF Treaty. These inspections included the presence of the United States' con tinuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, Russian Federation; and the conduct of on-site inspections by the United States. 
II.D. NET ASSESSMENT ON THE INF TREATY
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REPORT
The Presidential Report on noncompliance is made up of poor scholarship and errors of omission. The length of Presidential Report was divided as fol lows: violations (4 pages), compliant acts (0.2 pages), net assessment analysis (0.2 pages). Thus, violations got twenty times the space, compared to compliant acts and compared to the net assessment analysis. This is particularly shame ful because greater analysis already existed in the published SFRC Report on the START Treaty, which is given below.
III.A. VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY SS-23 Issue in SFRC START Report 8
The issue of undeclared the Soviet-manufactured SS-23s located in Eastern Europe has been addressed in a separate report (September 19, 1991) to the Congress. The Soviets had not declared the 72 SS-23 missiles involved in the programs of cooperation with the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the U.S. had not asked about these kinds of programs during the negotiation of the INF Treaty, partly because the U.S. did not wish to discuss the situation of the Pershing-I missiles that were owned (and later destroyed) by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pershing-I systems were under the joint control of the FRG and the U.S.
In a response to a question by Senator Pressler on the ultimate disposition of the SS-23s, the Administration stated:
German, Czech and Slovak federal governments have indicated that the mis siles in their possession would be destroyed when technical and environmental matters were resolved. Bulgaria, however has made conflicting statements on whether it will destroy its missiles. While continuing to press for destruction of the SS-23s, it is not in our interests to the delay reaping the benefits of START pending SS-23 destruction.
CONCLUSION ON INF VIOLATIONS
The six violations to the INF Treaty listed in the Presidential Report were not militarily significant. The issues raised were mostly a matter of sloppiness on the Soviet side and some disagreement as to procedures. The INF Treaty was very complicated to administer. This was particularly difficult for the decaying Soviet Union in 1988 to 1991. Because of these procedural problems on the INF Treaty, the START Treaty gave more certainty by growing to 280 pages, plus considerable auxiliary documents. The issue of the probable violation of SS-23 missiles was discussed in more detail in the SFRC START Report, which was available to the Executive Branch, than in the Presidential report. The SS-23 issue is confusing because the U.S. had a similar situation at the time of the negotiation, namely weapon systems shared with its ally Germany.
III.B. ACTS OF COMPLIANCE TO THE INF TREATY
INF Compliance Data in START Report, but Neglected in the Presidential Report 9
As of May 31, 1991, the Soviet Union eliminated all of its declared inter mediate range missiles and launchers, and all of its declared shorter-range missiles and launchers. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the Soviets eliminated 1,846 missiles with the capability to carry 3,154 warheads, and it destroyed 825 launchers. The Presidential Report should have informed us that the number of Soviet removed warheads (3,154) is over three times the number of U.S. removed war heads (856). In addition, the Presidential Report should have given estimates of the effectiveness of these warheads on allied targets. Such a quantitative anal ysis was carried out on page 52 of the Senate Report on START, which used an exchange model to determine survivable forces, with and without violations.
There is a strange lesson to be learned here. It should be clear to most readers that the INF Treaty was necessary to end the Cold War peacefully. Without the INF Treaty, it is unlikely that the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty would have allowed reductions in conventional arms. Without CFE, there would not have been START, thus making the ending of the Cold War more difficult. The authors of the Presidential Report did not want to make these kinds of positive statements on arms control, nor did they give the specific accomplishments of arms control. This is an important lesson for historians and future leaders.
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